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A g g r e g a t io n  a n d  D iv isib il it y  o f  D a m a g e  F r o m  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  C o n f l ic t  o f  L aw s P e r sp e c t iv e
Thomas Thiede*
I. Preliminary Remarks
Conflict o f  laws has changed fundam entally in the last decade(s) as a result o f  1 
the activities o f  the European legislator. A longside the international conven­
tions and the -  now  sometim es overruled -  national law, a set o f  unified rules 
applicable to cases w ith  a  relationship to a foreign jurisdiction and foreign law 
has been enacted on the European level. In alm ost all conflict o f  laws fields, 
the hitherto applicable national rules have been replaced by  directly applicable 
European regulations, e.g. the rules on international jurisdiction in  civil and 
com m ercial m atters (Regulation 44/2001, hereafter ‘Brussels I R egulation’) as 
w ell as on the law  applicable to non-contractual (“Rom e II”) as well as con­
tractual m atters (“Rom e I”), in  all European M em ber States.
A. The Basic Principles o f  Conflict o f  Laws
Basically, in all cases w ith a foreign element, e.g. w hen the dam age is incurred 2 
in one state but the harm  w as actually caused in  another, conflict rules set out 
to achieve two goals: Firstly, international cases should be decided in  harmony, 
i.e. different judgm ents from  different courts dealing w ith an identical case 
are to be avoided and secondly, every case should be subject to the law  o f  the 
jurisdiction to w hich the closest connection exists; no national law  should be 
applied to a case w ithout any substantive connection to the geographical, per­
sonal or other general circumstances.
In order to secure these objectives, two fundam entally different but interrelated 3 
sets o f  rules m ust be applied concordantly. First o f  all, the rules on internation­
al jurisdiction m ust be consulted in  order to find a court to determ ine the case. 
Secondly, the conflict rules provide the answer to the question w hich respec­
tive national substantive law  should be applied by the court seised. Experience 
shows that some national courts tend to apply their ow n substantive law  (lex 
fo r i)  w ithout any further consultation o f  the conflict rules because their own
* I dedicate this paper to my parents, Dipl.-Ing. Hannelore and Dipl.-Ing. Hans-Jörg Thiede.
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substantive law  (scil. their lex fo r i)  is the law  the judges are m ost familiar 
with. However, this approach contradicts the principle o f  international legal 
harmony: Skipping the test on conflict o f  laws w ould allow  the (merely alleg­
edly legitim ate) claim ant to choose a court and thereby a legal system w hich 
does not have the closest connection to the case at hand but has other aspects 
favourable to the claim ant, e.g. it m ay award very high am ounts o f  dam ages or 
have a particular evidence schem e.1 The conflict rules, as meta-law,2 prevent 
this k ind o f  fo rum  shopping  by  assigning ju s t one national law  exclusively to 
the case, regardless o f  w here the claim  is litigated. However, this positive ef­
fect was subject to lim itation since, up until the recent European unification, 
the conflict rules them selves were only national substantive rules: D ifferent 
conflict rules, originating from  different leges fo r i , assigned different national 
substantive laws to the one case. Therefore, the European harm onization o f  
the rules on international jurisdiction and the conflict rules are o f  exceptional 
significance since their unification and the fact that they prevail over national 
law  ease the above-m entioned problem s to a very  large extent: Basing their 
decision on the same rules to determ ine the com petent court seised and the law 
applicable to cases w ith a  foreign element, every European court o f  w hatever 
national jurisdiction, refers ultim ately to the same substantive law.
4  The considerations described above are the best example o f  the legal principles 
derived from the logics o f  conflict o f  laws on a m ethodological level. They 
are, however, only one part o f  the legal principles governing the m ethodology 
o f  this particular field o f  law. In addition, the general principles derived from 
the substantive law  ultim ately applied m ust always be considered w hen new  
conflict rules are to be put into legislation, existing rules are to be interpreted 
or w hen loopholes in  the existing codes or case law  have to be closed. Such an 
approach is constitutive, since last but not least substantive law, international 
jurisdiction and conflict rules are part o f  the same jurisdiction, w hich should 
not be contradictory in  itself but establish a coherent system o f  legal rules.3
1 It is, however, reasonable to recognize a right of a claimant to choose between different courts ac­
cording to his specific action when it comes to certain fact patterns (infra no. 10). Such a choice is, 
however, regarded as forum shopping when it is made to alter that party’s substantive legal entitle­
ments to his own advantage or, accordingly, to the disadvantage of his opponents. As a result, the 
law would no longer be providing a certain and predictable norm, neutrally applied between the 
parties. Cf. R.J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Quantifications of Damages, 42 Texas International 
Law Journal (Tex. Int’l L.J.) 311, 317. This principle is generally elaborated in F. Bydlinksi, System 
und Prinzipien des Privatrechts (1996) 92 ff. and subsequently reintroduced to conflict of laws by, 
e.g. S. Habermeier, Neue Wege zum Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht (1997) 191 ff.; J. Kropholler, Das 
Unbehagen am forum shopping, in: Festschrift Firsching (1985) 165 ff.; C. von Bar, Grundfragen 
des internationalen Deliktsrechts (Juristen Zeitung) JZ 1985, 961 ff.
2 For this term consult R. Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz -  falsche Fronten im 
IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in: Festschrift Kegel (1977) 213 ff.; W. Müller-Freienfels, 
IPR in der Normenhierarchie, in: Festskrift Hellner (1984) 369 ff.; C. von Bar/P. Mankowski, 
Internationales Privatrecht, vol. I (2003) no. 214; T Thiede/K. Ludwichowska, Die Haftung bei 
grenzüberschreitenden unerlaubten Handlungen, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissen­
schaft (ZVglRWiss) 106 (2007) 92, 94.
3 The consideration of these basic principles is last but not least demanded by fundamental rights 
in the respective national jurisdictions, the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the future Treaty
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This is supported by the fact that m ost principles o f  substantive law  are deter­
m ined and w ell-docum ented on a broad com parative basis. Furtherm ore, it is 
easier to observe these principles at a  supra-national level, since in  this context 
the legislator is not constricted by individual national interests but broadened 
by supra-national am bition. Hence, supra-national com parative analysis o f  the 
law  ultim ately applied should be taken into consideration w hen any legislation 
or legal practice in the area o f  conflict o f  laws is concerned and m ust be con­
sidered w hen conflict rules are to be enacted or interpreted.
B. Relevant scenarios for questions o f  aggregation and divisibility o f
dam ages
It should come as no surprise that an area o f  law which deals at best w ith ques- 5 
tions o f  bilateral contracts or road traffic accidents as well as transnational mar­
riages does not cover questions o f  aggregation and divisibility o f  damage to a 
great extent. Consequently, literature covering this specific question is almost 
absent. Furthermore, one has to be aware o f  the basic paradox o f  conflict rules: 
Specific legal concepts such as aggregation and divisibility o f  damage cannot be 
determined within the conflict rules since these rules contain material reference 
to the underlying legal problem only as far as the respective principles o f  the law 
ultimately applied are concerned.4 Nevertheless, from the perspective o f  the logic 
o f  conflict o f  laws, one m ay quite bluntly assume that in general any aggregation 
o f  damage in terms o f  competent courts and applicable law certainly fits better 
into the above-described principles o f  this area o f  law: I f  damage is internation­
ally split and occurs in several national jurisdictions, the efforts to have a single 
competent court and especially a  single applicable law may be antagonized.
How  divisibility o f  dam age, e.g. in cases o f  different dam age from the same 6 
cause, different consequential dam age from  the same direct dam age and, fi­
nally, different dam age from  sim ilar poses problem s for the pursuit o f  the latter 
objectives o f  the conflict o f  laws regim e is illustrated below  by m eans o f  two 
different scenarios basically downgrading the specific problem s in  the Q ues­
tionnaire to term s and realistic fact patterns in  conflict o f  laws.
Scenario 1 : One single tortfeasor causes a  m ultitude o f  (direct and conse­
quential) dam age in  different states.
Scenario 2: A  m ultitude o f  tortfeasors cause one single dam age in  one
state.
of Lisbon as well as European Convention of Human Rights. Cf. H. Koziol/T. Thiede, Kriti­
sche Bemerkungen zum derzeitigen Stand des Entwurfs einer Rom II-Verordnung, ZVglRWiss 
106 (2007) 235, 239; K. Siehr, Wechselwirkungen zwischen Kollisionsrecht und Sachrecht, 
Rabels Zeitschrift für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 37 (1973) 466, 
475; J. v. Hein, Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Internationalen Deliktsrecht (1999) 27; C. von Bar, 
Grundfragen des internationalen Deliktsrechts, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 1985, 961, 966.
4 Scil. whether a liability is j oint and solidary or not can de facto only be answered when the law 
applicable is already established.
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II. International Jurisdiction
A. Introduction
7 The needs o f  the com m on European m arket m eans the European legislator has 
long been active in  the area o f  international jurisdiction.5 As early as in 1968 
the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcem ents o f  Judgments 
in  Civil and Com m ercial M atters6 w as adopted by  the M em ber States o f  the 
European Com m unity and cam e into force in 1973 in  the EC M em ber States 
at that tim e.7 Subsequently, the Brussels Convention w as am ended by four ac­
cession conventions until it w as replaced for fourteen8 o f  the then fifteen EC 
M em ber States by Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcem ents o f  Judgm ents in Civil and Com m ercial M atters (“Brussels
I Regulation”)9 adopted by  the EC Council in  D ecem ber 2000, w hich entered 
into force on 1 M arch 2002. The Regulation, like the Convention earlier, lays 
dow n rules on direct jurisdiction, applicable by the court seised o f  the original 
action in  determ ining its ow n jurisdiction, and the recognition and enforcem ent 
o f  judgm ents given in  other M em ber States o f  the European U nion in  w hich 
the Regulation applies. In contrast to the prior Convention, the Regulation is 
directly applicable in the M em ber States under art. 249 (2) EC Treaty.10
8  The m aterial scope o f  the Brussels I Regulation is defined by  its art. 1 where- 
under the Regulation applies only to civil and com m ercial matters. Hence, for 
the Brussels I Regulation to be applicable, the subject m atter o f  the dispute 
m ust be o f  a  “civil or commercial nature”} 1 Consequently, the Regulation does 
not apply to a dispute betw een a private person and a public authority arising 
out o f  acts by  the public authority in  the exercise o f  its powers as such, but on 
the other hand, is applicable w hen neither party  to the dispute is a public body 
or w here a public body was not acting in exercise o f  its official pow ers.12
5 Cf. Recital 2 of the Brussels I Regulation: “Certain differences between national rules govern­
ing jurisdiction [...] hamper the sound operation of the internal market. [...]”
6 [1972] Official Journal (OJ) L 299, 32.
7 I.e. Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg and The Netherlands.
8 From 1 May 2004 it has also applied in the ten states which joined the European Community 
under the Treaty of Athens, cf. Athens Act of Accession, art. 2 and Annex II, Part 19 (A) (3).
9 [2001] OJ L 12, 1.
10 Since Denmark does not participate in Title IV of the EC Treaty in general and, as a conse­
quence, legal instruments adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters were not 
binding upon or applicable in this state. This situation was regarded as highly unsatisfactory 
and a convenient solution was found by means of public international law: The EU concluded a 
separate Convention with Denmark implementing the Brussels I Regulation as an international 
treaty, see [2005] OJ L 299, 62; [2005] OJ L 300, 55.
11 ECJ 14 October 1976, 29-76 LTU v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541.
12 ECJ 14 October 1976, 29-76 LTU v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541; 16 December 1980, 814/79 
Netherlands v Rüffer [1980] ECR 3807; 22 April 1993, C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] 
ECR I-1963; 1 Oktober 2002, C-167/00 VKI v Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111; 15 May 2003, 
C-266/01 TIARD v Staat der Nederlanden [2003] ECR I-4867.
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The basic rule o f  the Brussels Regulation concerning direct jurisdiction is en- 9 
shrined in  art. 2 o f  the Brussels I Regulation providing that “persons dom iciled  
in a M em ber State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued  in the courts o f  that 
state” .13 In order to ascertain w hether the defendant is dom iciled in  a M em ber 
State under this article, art. 59 o f  the Regulation, dealing w ith the question o f  
w hich country’s definition o f  dom icile is to be used, stipulates the ow n defini­
tion o f  the court o f  the EC M em ber State seised in order to determ ine w hether a 
person is dom iciled in  that state (lex fori). Only w hen the courts wants to reject 
the defendant’s dom icile at the forum  is it obliged to apply the definition o f  the 
state in  w hich it assum es the defendant’s dom icile m ight be (lex causae)}4
B. Special jurisdiction
A n exaggerated preference for the defendant’s dom icile does not always pro- 10 
vide the m ost appropriate, optim al solution in  all situations, actions and claims. 
Accordingly, the Regulation provides for particular alternative jurisdictions 
if  the defendant is to be sued in  the courts o f  a  state other than that o f  his do­
micile. In such cases, the choice o f  court is given to the plain tiff and it is not 
open to any o f  the courts involved to override the p la in tiff’s choice on any 
grounds.15 As the European legislator has frequently emphasized, this freedom 
o f choice w as introduced in  view  o f the existence in certain w ell-defined cases 
o f  a particularly close relationship betw een a dispute and the court w hich m ay 
be m ost conveniently called upon to adjudge the disputed m atter.16 One ex­
ception, however, is o f  interest w ith respect to the subject o f  aggregation and 
divisibility o f  damage: art. 5 (3) o f  the Regulation, stipulating that in m atters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, a  person dom iciled in  a M em ber State 
m ay be sued in another M em ber State “in the courts o f  the p lace  where the 
harm ful event occurred” .
13 The rationale behind this long-standing rule in favour of the defendant’s domicile was analysed 
excellently by the ECJ in 17 June 1992, C-26/91 Handte v TMCS [1992] ECR I-3967 noting 
that the rule reflects the purpose of strengthening the legal protection of persons established 
within a particular current “national” jurisdiction, and rests on an assumption that a defendant 
can normally most easily conduct his defence in the courts of his domicile. See also ECJ 28 
September 1999, C-440/97 Groupe Concorde v “Suhadiwarno Panjan” [1999] ECR I-6307. 
Furthermore, the defendant presumably keeps most of his assets at his domicile and hence en­
forcement against his person or property can most easily be effected there. Thus, the rule tends 
to concentrate both adjudication of the merits and enforcement of the judgment in the same 
country, thereby avoiding unnecessary procedural complications.
14 E.g. if the Austrian courts, having decided on the basis of their own definition that a person is 
not domiciled in Austria, want to know whether the defendant is domiciled in Poland they must 
apply the Polish definition of domicile. For legal entities see art. 60 Brussels I Regulation.
15 Notably, the regulation does not provide any escape clause rule, which would allow the court, 
seised to refer to any more close relationship, e.g. a common habitual residence.
16 Cf. Recital 11 of the Brussels I Regulation stipulating that “The rules of jurisdiction must be 
highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the 
defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few 
well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the par­
ties warrants a differing linking factor [■■■]”
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11 To begin with, the court has already decided upon facts w hich correspond 
to some extent to Scenario 1 above involving a horticultural com pany in the 
N etherlands, m ainly depending on the w aters o f  the Rhine for irrigating its 
plants, w hich suffered from the pollution o f  the riv er’s w ater by  the discharge 
o f  saline w aste from a potash m ine established in  France.17 Up to this decision 
concerning the w ording o f  art. 5 (3) Brussels I Regulation it w as particularly 
unclear w hether the courts o f  the country w here the wrongful act took p lace  
(i.e. France) or the courts w here the resulting infringement o f  the pro tected  
right arose (i.e. The N etherlands) had jurisdiction over the m atter.18 The ECJ 
held that the text m ust be understood as covering both  the place where the 
infringem ent -  and  not only the damage -  occurred19 and the place w here the 
event giving rise to it took place and, as a rationale, referred to the respective 
equal proxim ity o f  both courts to the w rongful conduct or the infringem ent 
sustained -  w ith the result being that the defendant m ust be sued, at the choice 
o f  the plaintiff, either in  the courts at the place w here the infringem ent oc­
curred or in  the courts at the place where the event giving rise to it occurred. It 
m ust be noted that these two options are not exclusive and do not deprive the 
p la in tiff o f  his right to sue in  the country o f  the defendant’s dom icile pursuant 
to the general provision.20
12 These places may, and quite frequently will, coincide, but nevertheless, this 
rule poses problem s in cases concerning an international divisibility o f  dam ­
age, i.e. m ulti-state torts such as, for example, invasions o f  personality rights 
(Scenario 1). H ow  this affects jurisdictional issues was dem onstrated by a case 
o f  a libel action brought by an English w om an against the publisher o f  a  French 
new spaper o f  w hich 0.1% w as distributed in  the U nited K ingdom .21 Evidently,
17 ECJ 30 November 1976, 21-76 Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA 
[1976] ECR 1735; see J. Schacherreiter, Leading Decisions (2008) no. 261.
18 The prevalent opinion understood the art. 5 (3) Brussels I Convention as an alternative to the 
general rule resulting only in a jurisdiction at the actual place of conduct (i.e in this example 
France), see G.A.L. Droz, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe [2002] no. 76; M. 
Weser, Convention communautaire sur la compétence judiciaire et l’exécution des decisions 
[1975] no. 225bis; E. Mezger, Drei Jahre EG-Zustandigkeits- und Vollstreckungsübereinkom­
men in Frankreich, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 1976, 345, 347.
19 Cf. this now also holds true for France, see S. Galand-Carval, Aggregation and Divisibility of 
Damage in France: Tort Law and Insurance, (contained in this volume) no. 47 ff. referring to 
Cass. Civ. 11 January 1984, Bull. Civ. no. 360; See also Cour de cassation, 11 May 1999, Jour­
nal du Droit International (J.D.I.) 126 (1999) 1048.
This seems to constitute a major change in the French judicature: See with a referral to the “ lieu 
de prejudiceCour de cassation, Urteil vom 25. Mai 1948, Revue critique de Droit Internation­
al Privé (Rec. crit. DIP) 39 (1949) 89; Cour d’appel Paris, 18 October 1955, Rev. crit. DIP 45 
(1956) 484 ff; or “loi du lieu où le dommage a été réalisé“: Cour de cassation, 8 February 1983, 
J.D.I. 111 (1984) 123, 125; finally “[...] que la loi applicable à la responsabilité extracontrac­
tuelle est celle de l ’Etat du lieu où le fait dommageable s ’est produit; que ce lieu s ’entend aussi 
bien celui du fait générateur du dommage que du lieu de réalisation de ce dernier”. Cour de 
cassation, 14 January 1997, Rev. crit. DIP 86 (1997) 504, 505.
20 Infra no. 9.
21 ECJ 7 March 1995, C-68/93 Fiona Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415. The defama­
tory statements related to alleged money-laundering for drug-traffickers by a bureau de change 
in Paris in which the plaintiff was temporarily employed.
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vesting jurisdiction in both the courts o f  the state w here the harm  occurred and 
at the place o f  w rongful conduct is highly problem atic: To begin with, it was 
unclear whether a particular court is at the place where the harm  occurred or 
where the w rongful conduct took place. Furtherm ore, at first glance the solu­
tion m ight am ount to a situation w here the victim  could basically obtain the 
right to com bine several courts o f  jurisdiction, e.g. suing the publisher in  Eng­
land and France respectively, and each tim e in  respect o f  the full damage.
The ECJ becam e aw are o f  this preposterous invitation to fo ru m  shopping  and 13 
tried to correct the consequences by introducing certain  lim itations on the 
choice o f  the plaintiff: Firstly, the court draws a distinction betw een the initial 
injury and consequential losses, and it refuses to perm it a  p la in tiff to sue in  the 
courts o f  any place w here he has m erely suffered pure econom ic loss conse­
quential on an initial infringem ent o f  his protected  right sustained elsewhere. 
Hence, only the prim ary infringem ent o f  the protected right is relevant for the 
assessm ent o f  the com petent court under art. 5 (3) Brussels I Convention.22 
This rule extends to secondary victim s w ho m ay only sue in  the ju risd iction  
w here the prim ary victim  w as harm ed. Finally, in  the libel case above, the 
court held  that the publisher could be sued in  the place o f  the w rongful con­
duct, i.e. a t his establishm ent for a ll the harm  caused by  the defam ation, or 
before the courts o f  each country  w here the publication w as distributed and 
caused damage. However, in  the latter case, the courts o f  each country have 
jurisd iction  solely in respect o f  the dam age caused  within their own terri­
tory.23
It should not autom atically be assum ed that the lim itations proposed by the Eu- 14 
ropean Court entirely solve the problem s o f  divisibility o f  dam age as regards 
international jurisdiction. In cases o f  infringem ent o f  personality rights, for 
example, the rule that neither indirect dam age suffered elsewhere than in the 
original place nor dam age suffered by secondary victim s vests jurisdiction in 
national courts, leads to a situation where a p la in tiff claim ing com pensation for 
his m ental affliction suffered in  England and brought about by  a defam atory 
publication concerning his son w hich w as distributed only in  France m ay only
22 Cf. ECJ 11 January 1990, C-220/88 Dumez v Hessische Landesbank [1990] ECR I-49; 19 Sep­
tember 1995, C-364/93 Marinari v Lloyds Bank [1995] ECR I-2719; 27 October 1998, C-51/97, 
for both decisions J. Schacherreiter, Leading Decisions (2008) no. 262 and 263.
23 This solution basically descended from a French approach to the specific problem. However 
the “original” French solution basically reduced the application to the lex fori by introducing a 
certain causal connection and an application of the place where the harm (and not the original 
infringement of the legal interest, sic!) occurred (supra fn. 19): “Attendu, en revanche, que les 
dommages provoqués par l ’édition et la diffusion, en Allemagne, des publications litigieuses 
n’ont aucun lien de causalité avec ceux résultant de la diffusion de ce dernières en France; que, 
dans ces conditions, ces dommages ne se rattachent à ce tribunal ni par lieu de réalisation, ni 
par celui des actes fautifs; que ce tribunal est en conséquence incompétent pour connaître de 
l ’action en réparation du préjudice subi par la demanderesse en Allemagne [...]” TGI Paris, 27 
April 1983, Rev. crit. DIP 72 (1983) 672, 674. Hence, a fundamental difference to the scheme 
of Shevill arises, cf J.-M. Bischoff, annotation to Cass. Civ., 14 January 1997, Rev. crit. DIP 86 
(1997) 505, 513.
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sue the publisher in France, but not in England. Correspondingly, the test on 
w hether a distant harm  is adequately consequential on an initial injury to give 
jurisdiction to a local court m ay render rather poor results, e.g. if  a  Parisian 
lawyer w ants to sue in  France arguing that defam atory statements, although 
spread by the defendant in England only, have caused him  financial damage 
in  France by  losing him  English clients. Finally, the lim itation on recognition 
and jurisdiction according to the national borders o f  the state where the harm  
occurred constitutes a return o f  the court to the actor sequitur fo rum  rei rule, 
adm ittedly w ith a  certain shift tow ards the courts where the harm  occurred. 
D espite the fact that this accentuation o f  the latter court(s) proves appropriate 
since these courts have the closest connection to the alleged victim s o f  the 
dam age, victim s who have suffered considerable dam age in  several countries 
are well advised to consult legal experts in  order to select the M em ber State or 
a  com bination o f  M em ber States where their prospects o f  successful litigation 
are best.24
15 The above considerations so far only reflect Scenario 1 and possible plurality 
o f  losses in different places. Vice versa a  situation where m ultiple tortfeasors 
act as principal and servant m ight becom e relevant for this provision (Scenario 
2), i.e. whether the plain tiff can hold the principal liable at the place where 
only the servant acted. One should bear in  m ind that virtually all European ju ­
risdictions and accordingly the Principles o f  European Tort L aw  (PETL) hold 
the principal liable w hen he “acts” via an instructed and (socially) dependent 
accom plice.25 Hence, it seems reasonable to extend the jurisdiction to that prin­
cipal even w hen he h im self or his accom plice are not dom iciled at the place 
w here the harm ful event giving rise to the dam age occurred, since ultim ately 
the person enlarging his sphere o f  action via assistants should bear the risk o f  
court proceedings in  the country where said assistants acted.26
C. A ncillary jurisdiction and concurrent proceedings (lis pendens)
16 W hereas the special jurisdiction under art. 5 (3) Brussels I Regulation fits Sce­
nario 2 only in  special circum stances, art. 6 o f  the Regulation provides for a 
m uch broader scope o f  aggregation o f  different claim s against m ultiple tort-
24 M. Bogdan, Private International Law Aspects of Trans-Border Invasion of Personality Rights 
by the Media, in: A. Beater/S. Habermeier, Verletzungen von Persönlichkeitsrechten durch die 
Medien (2005) 138, 142; see also C. von Bar, Persönlichkeitsschutz im gegenwärtigen und 
zukünftigen deutschen internationalen Privatrecht, in: Law in East and West/Recht in Ost und 
West, Festschrift zum 30jährigen Jubiläum des Institutes für Rechtsvergleichung der Waseda 
Universität (1988) 575 ff.; W. Nixdorf, Presse ohne Grenzen: Probleme grenzüberschreitender 
Veröffentlichungen, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (GRUR) 1996, 842, 844; H. 
Schack, Grenzüberschreitende Verletzung allgemeiner und Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte, Ar­
chiv für Urheber-, Film-, Funk- und Theaterrecht (UFITA) 108 (1988) 51, 66; P Mankowski, 
Art. 5 in: U. Magnus/P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (2007) no. 207 ff.
25 See, art. 6:102 (1) PETL.
26 See E. Rabel, Conflict of Laws, vol. II (1960) 318: “Hence, the theory advocating the law of the 
place of acting is entirely antiquated if it stresses physical movements. Not the locality where a 
person operates, but that to which his operations are directed, is material.”
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feasors. A ccording to this provision, the Brussels I Regulation recognizes the 
desirability, in  the interest o f  the sound adm inistration o f  justice and o f  re ­
ducing the risk  o f  conflicting judgm ents, that related disputes be decided to ­
gether in  a single proceeding and allow  for the joining before a  single court o f  
closely connected claim s over w hich several different courts w ould ordinarily 
be com petent under the Regulation. Hence, art. 6 Brussels I Regulation pro­
vides ancillary jurisdiction over co-defendants, even i f  the court seised w ould 
not have had jurisdiction to entertain the additional claim  in its ow n right, i.e. 
under art. 2 or 5 (3) Brussels I Regulation.27 Basically, the provision holds that 
a “person dom iciled in a contracting state m ay also be sued  [ ...]  where he is 
one o f  a num ber o f  defendants in the courts fo r  the p lace where any one o f  them  
is dom iciled.”2*
Apparently, this exception to the general rule o f  art. 2 Brussels I Regulation -  17 
presum ably stipulating a jurisdiction other than that o f  the defendant’s domicile 
-  substantially aggravates the danger o f  m isuse by resulting in  proceedings b e ­
ing brought against a num ber o f  defendants w ith the sole object o f  ousting the 
jurisdiction o f  the particular courts w here one o f  the defendants is domiciled. 
Accordingly, two general conditions o f  its application m ust be met. To begin 
with, jurisdiction over a connected claim  against a defendant dom iciled in  an ­
other M em ber State belongs exclusively to the courts o f  the dom icile o f  one o f  
the other defendants.29 Furtherm ore, the European Court o f  Justice30 held that, 
to justify  that claim s against various defendants dom iciled in  different M em ber 
States be heard and determ ined by one single court, there m ust be a connection  
betw een the various actions brought by  the same claim ant against the different 
defendants o f  such kind that it is expedient to hear them  together in  order to 
avoid irreconcilable judgm ents.31 W hen this particular condition is met, does 
not depend on w hether the loss caused is indivisible or not:32 The Court clearly 
referred on several occasions only to the risk o f  judgm ents i f  decided sepa­
rately rendering contradictory results, even i f  those judgm ents w ere m utually
27 Moreover, this principle is given negative effect by art. 27-30 preventing concurrent actions in 
different Member States in similar or related issues.
28 Consistently, the Regulation extends to a counterclaim, so as to enable a defendant who coun­
terclaims against a local plaintiff to join a foreign co-defendant to the counterclaim and simi­
larly to a claim by a third party (joined by a defendant) against local or foreign plaintiffs.
29 In particular, there is no requirement that one certain claim must be more essential to harm 
ultimately caused and the court at the “the spider at the centre of the web” is exclusively em­
powered to hear the multiple connected claims, however small the claimed contributory part by 
the others defendants might have been. Cf. H. Muir Watt, Art. 6, in: U. Magnus/P. Mankowski, 
Brussels I Regulation (2007) no. 23, 25.
30 ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87 Kalfelis v Schröder [1988] ECR 5565; 27 October 1998, 
C-51/97 Réunion Européenne v Spliethoffs Bevrachtingskantoor [1998] ECR I-6511.
31 ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87 Kalfelis v Schröder [1988] ECR 5565; 27 October 1998, 
C-51/97 Réunion Européenne v Spliethoffs Bevrachtingskantoor [1998] ECR I-6511.
32 In particular, it rejected the French notion of indivisibility as a requirement of ancillary j urisdic- 
tion -  which was proposed in order to secure that possible other courts are not ousted -  had no 
place within the scheme of the Convention. See ECJ 24 June 1981, 150/80 Elefantenschuh v 
Pierre Jacqmain [1981] ECR 1671.
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exclusive and could even be executed separately.33 A ny further rem arks on the 
quality o f  the connection necessary, however, could not be gathered since the 
European Court stated explicitly that it was “fo r  the national courts in each 
individual case whether that condition is satisfied’’34 thus basically referring 
the questions back to the national courts and giving them  significantly more 
leew ay w hen assessing possible jurisdiction over m ultiple defendants.
18  Quite sim ilar to the problem  explained above is the question o f  w hen proceed­
ings sim ultaneously pend ing  in courts o f  different M em ber States could ef­
fectuate jurisdiction in  respect o f  disputes, w hich are factually and legally the 
sam e.35 Concerning two related cases, art. 28 Brussels I Convention basically 
confers upon the courts o f  the respective M em ber State discretion to stay their 
proceeding in  favour o f  the first court seised, in order to constrain irreconcil­
able judgm ents. A s far as identical cases, i.e. identical claim ants and identical 
facts are concerned, art. 27 Brussels I Regulation provides a clear and effective 
m echanism  for resolving cases o f  lis prendens  and related actions by prim ar­
ily establishing a test based on chronological priority,36 according to w hich a 
court subsequently seised is required to decline jurisdiction in favour o f  the 
first court seised, instead o f  perform ing a judicial evaluation o f  the relative 
appropriateness o f  the two fora.
III. Applicable Law
A. Introduction
19 It is w orth reiterating the basic concepts from the start: W hen only the rules 
on international jurisdiction are applied, the court seised applies its substantive 
national law, i.e. its lex fo r i  and the result o f  the case depends on w here it is 
brought to a national court. Such state o f  law  has long been considered unsat­
isfactory and in  particular during the past century several earnest but unsuc­
cessful attem pts at the elaboration o f  a unified legal act on the law  applicable 
to non-contractual obligations on a European level have been undertaken.37
33 A differentiation concerning the basis of claim (see, ECJ 27 September 1988, 189/87 Kalfelis/ 
Schröder [1988] ECR 5565; 27 October 1998, C-51/97 Réunion Européenne v Spliethoff ’s Bev- 
rachtingskantoor [1998] ECR I-6511), however, was proposed by the court, but, as recently as 
2007 given up. See, ECJ 11 October 2007, C-98/06 Freeportplc v OlleArnoldsson [2007] ECR 
I-8319.
34 Supra fn. 31.
35 However, especially art. 28 Brussels I Regulation differs in structure as well as function: 
Whereas art. 6 Brussels I regulation addresses the court originally seised of a claim and allows 
to extend its jurisdiction, art. 28 provides for related actions, which are each already pending 
before the courts of different Member States. The main difference, however, lies within the 
original competence of the courts seised: art. 28 Brussels I Regulation allows to join proceed­
ings pending before originally competent courts -  whereas art. 6 vests jurisdiction in an other­
wise incompetent court by virtue of the close connection described above, see no. 17.
36 Prior tempore potior iure.
37 The Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted, i nter alia, two conventions i n the 
field of tort law concerning cases of traffic accidents and product liability in 1973 and 1971 
respectively. See <http://www.hcch.net>. Given the restrictions to single issues by the Hague
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Finally, in  2003 the European Com m ission officially addressed the issue, p re­
senting a new  proposal, w hich was critically discussed and re-drafted several 
times. Finally, a  revised38 version resulted in the enactm ent o f  Regulation (EC)
No. 864/2007 o f  the European Parliam ent and o f  the Council o f  11 July 2oo7 
on the law  applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation).39 
It entered into force on 11 January 2009 for all cases where the dam age event 
occurs thereafter.40
The Rom e II Regulation covers all non-contractual obligations in  “civil and  2 0  
commercial m atters” having m ultistate contacts o f  the kind and pertinence that 
im plicate the laws o f  m ore than one state. This scope o f  the Regulation is, 
however, restricted by  a list o f  specific exclusions and the application o f  its 
general rule in art. 4 (1) is further lim ited by  a num ber o f  special rules cover­
ing product liability, unfair com petition, environm ental damage, infringem ents 
o f  intellectual property rights and industrial action. Furtherm ore, violations o f  
privacy and rights relating to personality are so far excluded, w aiting for a re­
spective study and further clarification pursuant to the review  clause o f  art. 30.
This research extends to a study on the effects o f  art. 28 w ith  respect to the 
Hague Convention o f  4 M ay 1971 on the law  applicable to traffic accidents:41 
so far the Regulation is highly unsatisfactory because art. 28 provides that 
the Regulation regim e “shall not prejudice the application o f  international 
conventions to which one or more m em ber states are parties at the time when 
this Regulation is adopted and  which lay down conflict o f  law rules relating to 
non-contractual obligations”.
Conference, the European Union attempted a more comprehensive agenda and presented a draft 
convention on the harmonization of the conflict rules in contractual as well as non-contractual 
obligations also in the early 1970s. See, RabelsZ 38 (1974) 211. With the expansion of the 
European Community, this ambition ultimately abated and the decision was made to abandon 
the tort provisions of the draft convention and instead concentrate on conflict rules for contract 
conflicts resulting in the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
1980.
The idea of a harmonization of the rules concerning non-contractual obligations was revived in 
the late 1990s, when the European Community acquired in the course of the so-called ’’Vienna 
Action Plan” legislative competence in the field of conflict of laws under art. 61 and 65 Treaty 
of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997.
38 Already in 2001 there was an unpublished version of the green book (cf. J. von Hein, ZVglR- 
Wiss 2003, 528, 533), followed by a preliminary draft in May 2002. After consultation, an 
amended proposal was adopted in July 2003 (COM 2003 427 final). Due to the needs of the then 
newly established conciliation procedure under art. 251 EC Treaty, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs presented several reports by Diana Wallis on the topic -  differ­
ing substantially from the Commission proposals -  and this was comprehensively commented 
on. After long and difficult negotiations, compromises on the most controversial issues were 
reached while others were suspended to a future revision of the Regulation. For an initial over­
view cf. B.A. Koch, European Union, in: H. Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 
2003 (2004) 435 no. 1 ff.; id. in: European Tort Law 2005 (2006) 593 no. 10 ff.; id. in: European 
Tort Law 2006 (2008) 487, no. 3 ff.
39 OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, 40-49.
40 Presumably, a drafting error in art. 32, 31 Rome II may suggest an earlier date of application, 
cf. Koch, European Tort Law 2006 (fn. 38) fn. 3.
41 Supra fn. 37.
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21 In the light o f  the Hague Convention on Traffic A ccidents -  w hich provides ex­
traordinarily com plex and rather outdated rules on traffic accidents ultim ately 
leading to a rejection o f  this Convention by  the better part o f  the European 
M em ber States -  different legal regim es now  govern that area in w hich the 
m ost practical and especially num erous conflict cases arise, i.e. international 
car accidents. This inevitably results in  cases o f  fo rum  shopping  facilitated 
ironically by a com m unity instrum ent originally aim ed at preventing suchlike 
iniquitous behaviour.42
B. G eneral rule and (prevailing) special rules
2 2  The thus lim ited general rule o f  the Regulation stipulates the lex loci delicti, 
(mis-) understood however, by  the Rom e II drafters as the law  o f  the place o f  
the injury or o f  the infringem ent o f  the protected interest (lex loci damni). A c­
cording to the Regulation, the applicable law  shall be the law  o f  the country in 
w hich the harm  occurs,
“irrespective o f  the country in  w hich the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred” (art. 4 (1) Rom e II Regulation) and “regardless o f  the coun­
try  or countries in  w hich the indirect consequences could occur. A ccord­
ingly in  countries o f  personal injury or dam age to property, the country 
in  w hich the dam age occurs should be the country where the injury was 
sustained or the property was dam aged respectively.”43
2 3  The European legislator held that such “princip le o f  the lex loci delicti com ­
missi is the basic solution fo r  non-contractual obligations in virtually all the 
mem ber states” though it adm itted that the “practica l application o f  this p r in ­
ciple [ ...]  varies”.44 And, indeed, the lex loci delicti is the basic rule in all 
M ember States. Nonetheless, the allegation by the European legislator that the 
lex damni is used as the com pelling connecting factor m ust be called into ques­
tion given that some countries opt for the place o f  conduct in general,45 others
42 For a more detailed analysis of the problem, see T Thiede/M. Kellner, “Forum Shopping” 
zwischem dem Haager Übereinkommen über das auf Verkehrsunfälle anzuwendende Recht 
und der Rom-II-Verordnung, Versicherungsrecht (VersR) 2007, 1624.
43 See Recital 17 of the Regulation. For a further elaboration of this principle of lex loci damni an 
example (slightly transformed from the Case Study in the original Questionnaire) may illustrate 
the inherent problem: In a car park in State A, just before crossing the border with State B, D 
decides to poison P. Unbeknown to P, D puts a noxious chemical into P’s water bottle, which 
is in P’s luggage for his trip to State C via State B. While in State B, P gives some of the con­
taminated water to his dog, which he has taken with him on his journey. Shortly after, the dog 
starts to vomit, making a mess of P’s car. After arriving in State C, P himself takes a sip from 
the water and consequently falls sick, suffering from stomach cramps. Moreover, whilst still in 
State C, P has to pay € 150 to the vet for examining his dog. As far as the compensation for the 
cleaning of the car is concerned, the law of State B would be applied since the dog’s poisoning 
resulted there in the damage to P’s car. Accordingly, P’s pain and suffering would be determined 
according to the laws of State C since his condition was sustained there. Only the costs of the 
vet are a consequential loss and would, hence, be determined according to the laws of State B.
44 See Recital 15 of the Regulation.
45 Austrian PIL Act of June 15, 1978 § 48(1); Polish PIL Act 1965 art. 33(1).
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opt for the place o f  injury,46 others apply the law  o f  the place o f  conduct in 
some specified cases and the law  o f  injury in  other cases,47 still others leave 
the question unanswered,48 and, finally, some M em ber States allow  the victim  
or the court to choose betw een the laws.49 Hence, it w ould have been far more 
auspicious if  the Rom e II codifiers had realised that the current national codes 
contain at least im portant allusions to the lex loci delicti com m issi and not 
m erely variations o f  the application o f  a general principle o f  lex damni. As 
already explained above, the scope o f  art. 4 Rom e II Regulation is additionally 
som ewhat lim ited by specific exclusions set out in the Regulation. Surpris­
ingly, it m ust be noted that questions concerning the predom inantly im portant 
fact patterns w ere deem ed too m ajor and too special a category to leave to the 
lex damni rule, w ith  the result that the legislator referred them  to the -  other­
wise obliviously disregarded -  lex loci delicti commissi.
This, however, am ounts to a situation where the legislator alleges to have found 2 4  
a consensus on a general rule but then subjects such in (almost) all relevant 
cases to an otherw ise concealed rejected rule. In the light o f  this lex specialis 
approach by the drafters and the existing and accessible national codes and 
case law  explained above, com parative research o f  the basic principles gov­
erning tort law  in general and, accordingly, conflict o f  laws in  the area o f  tort, 
w ould have been far m ore propitious than this gam e o f  hide and seek -  and 
m ight have revealed a general principle governing this field o f  conflict rules.
Basically, it is understood in all European M em ber States, and, accordingly, 2 5  
in the Principles o f  European Tort Law  (PETL), that the m ain purpose o f  tort 
law  is the restitutio a d  integrum  -  the (full) com pensation o f  dam age.50 This 
basic principle is, however, lim ited to the extent that this dam age is attribut­
able to the tortfeasor -  a rule w isely enshrined in  the old rule o f  casum sentit 
dom inus . In addition, it is generally agreed that to rt law  has an additional aim 
o f  prevention, since having to com pensate basically has a deterrent effect.51 
Accordingly, these general objectives pursued by substantive tort law  can be 
translated into term s o f  conflict o f  laws.52 The general idea o f  com pensation 
and a general focus on the indem nification o f  the victim  prim a  fa c ie  suggests 
the application o f  the lex damni: The v ictim ’s legitim ate expectations focus 
on the protection provided by the law  o f  the country where he participates in 
public intercourse and, thereby, exposes his rights and interests to potential 
infringem ents.53 The victim  o f  a w rongful act is typically not a qualified law-
46 Dutch PIL Act, art. 3(2); English PIL Act 1995 § 11.
47 See Portuguese Civ. Code, art. 45 (1), (2); Swiss PIL Act, art. 133(2).
48 Spanish Civ. Code art. 9; Greek Civ. Code, art. 26; Czechoslovakian PIL Act of 1963, art. 15.
49 EGBGB, art. 40(1); Hungarian PIL Decree of 1979 § 32 (1)(2); Italian PIL Act of May 31, 1995, 
art. 62(1).
50 See, art. 1:101 PETL.
51 U. Magnus, Comparative Report, in: U. Magnus (ed.), Unification of Tort Law: Damages 
(2001) 187; F. Bydlinksi, System und Prinzipien (1996) 190 ff; M. Faure, Economic Analysis, 
in: B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002) 364 ff.
52 Cf. infra no. 4.
53 G. Wagner, IPRax 2006, 372 (374).
440 Thomas Thiede
yer; nevertheless, one m ay assume that he has confidence in  the standards o f 
com pensation at the place w here the harm  occurred, very often the place o f  his 
habitual residence. M oreover, the developm ent o f  systems not prim arily based 
on some concept o f  reproach for m isbehaviour and w hich instead shift the 
focus to at least additional or even entirely different aspects such as objective 
danger (“strict liability”)54 m ay support the application o f  the lex dam ni.55 A c­
cordingly, some authors56 assume that in  m odern to rt law  and in  the context o f  
conflict o f  laws, a focus on the loss sustained and, thus, the application o f  the 
lex damni, is required by  liability for exposure to loss and the fact that in  some 
instances o f  liability there is, moreover, hardly any prerequisite other than cau­
sation o f  the dam age sustained (strict liability). Finally, an application o f  the 
law  at the place w here the harm  occurred is considered sim pler in Scenario 2 
above: I f  m ultiple w rongful acts in different jurisdictions are the conditio sine 
qua non for one detrim ental result, the application o f  the lex damni seems to be 
the simple and straightforward solution for the judge.
2 6  A ll these argum ents m ay be valid  in them selves, but they focus only on the 
v ic tim ’s interests. Such general concerns for the victim  are excessive and to 
this extent som ew hat misplaced. A n appropriate solution m ust focus on the 
interests o f  all parties involved, including those o f  the tortfeasor. As already 
stated, substantive law  dictates that a person has to com pensate for another 
person’s injury only i f  certain requirem ents o f  liability are met: A  person is 
only under obligation to render com pensation i f  the dam age is legally attribut­
able to him  -  casum sentit dom inus.51 Accordingly, for questions o f  conflict 
o f  laws, it is necessary to determ ine w hich law  should provide the criteria for 
this attribution. in  cases o f  liability based on fault, the law  o f  the state where 
the conduct in  question took place governs these criteria since everybody has 
to com ply w ith the rules and standards o f  that country in  w hich he acts (as­
suming that this is the place o f  his habitual residence). To the same extent, the 
confidence o f  the victim  in the relevant standards o f  the state w here the harm  
occurred has to be considered whereas sim ultaneously the expectations o f  the 
tortfeasor according to the standards o f  the state where he com m its the tortious 
action m ust be taken into account. To begin with, an attributable, negligent b e­
haviour by  the w rongdoer requires in  any case that he w as able to recognise the 
legal standards w ith w hich he had to com ply beforehand. These considerations 
argue for the place o f  conduct, the lex loci delicti commissi.58
54 B.A. Koch/H. Koziol, Comparative Conclusions, in: B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds.), Unification of 
Tort Law: Strict Liability (2002) 395 ff.
55 See on this topic only H. Stoll, Zweispurige Anknüpfung von Verschuldens- und Gefährdung­
shaftung im internationalen Deliktsrecht? in: Festschrift Ferid (1918) 391.
56 T. Kadner Graziano, Gemeineuropäisches Internationales Privatrecht (2002) 218.
51 Accordingly, there is no “level playing field” as suggested by G.Wagner, Internationales De­
liktsrecht, die Arbeiten an der Rom II-Verordnung und der europäische Deliktsgerichtsstand, 
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 2006, 312 (316); T. Kadner- 
Graziano, Das auf außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht nach Inkrafttre­
ten der Rom II-Verordnung, RabelsZ 13 (209) 1 (36).
58 Moreover, the deterrent effect of tort law also supports the application of the law of the place 
of conduct, since the threat of future liability can only induce prudent behaviour if the potential
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In this stalemate situation betw een the two possible connecting factors, the 2 7  
argum ent o f  the sim plicity o f  application o f  lex loci damni remains. W hen this 
line o f  reasoning is applied to the test o f  aggregation or divisibility o f  damage, 
the results rendered m ay no longer seem acceptable in  Scenario 1: Especially in 
cases concerning intellectual property and personality rights,59 the lex damni 
rule m ay actually result in  exorbitant difficulties since dam age m ay occur in 
m ore than one geographical location and, thus, a m ultitude o f  laws m ay be ren ­
dered applicable. This results in  a difficult m osaic assessm ent (M osaikbeurtei- 
lung) o f  one single claim, i.e. the separation o f  the overall harm  into several 
independent torts, w hich then should be subsum ed by  one single court.60
Indeed, in  cases o f  m ultiple tortfeasors’ conduct resulting in only one injury 2 8  
as in  Scenario 2, the current rule m ay provide acceptable results at first glance. 
However, w hen the scenario is varied to a situation where the conduct results 
in m ultiple dam age events in  different countries, due to the m osaic assess­
m ent o f  the respective losses, the internal recourse o f  the respective tortfeasors 
w ould be entirely corrupted: I f  m ultiple tortfeasors are liable under several 
laws, their internal redress m ay be determ ined differently by the laws applied, 
e.g. in cases where one law  applied has specific provisions w hich exclude a re ­
course action against the other w rongdoers.61 Since according to art. 20 Rome
II Regulation the internal recourse o f  the tortfeasors is governed by  the law  ap­
plicable to the respective original claim, the problem  o f the m osaic assessm ent 
w ould be exponentially aggravated and a  coherent recourse action betw een the 
tortfeasors w ould not be possible. Hence, the argum ent o f  sim plicity m ust also 
be rejected.
The foregoing general rem arks are not intended as a general argum ent for a 2 9  
general application o f  the law  at the to rtfeasor’s place o f  w rongful conduct, but 
instead to take account o f  the fact that tort law  in general does not focus solely
tortfeasor is aware of the applicable standards of conduct; this is most likely in respect of the 
standards at the place of conduct. Furthermore, the proposition that modern tort law and par­
ticularly strict liability demands a focus on the loss sustained must be rejected: Liability based 
on fault is still the core of tort law (See, P. Widmer, Bases of liability, in: European Group on 
Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law (2005) 68; C. v. Bar, The Common European Law of 
Torts, vol. I (1998) no. 11.) and, in addition, strict liability is not liability for any loss sustained 
-  strict liability regularly covers situations of extraordinary danger requiring a correspondingly 
extraordinary allocation of responsibility and is applied in cases where a highly significant risk 
of harm remains despite all proper precautions taken by the defendant. (See, B.A. Koch, Strict 
Liability, in: European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law (2005) 105.) None­
theless, there is no clear-cut concept of strict liability, not even within any single jurisdiction.
Hence, every proprietor of an exceptional source of danger will assume that the law of the place 
where this danger is actually situated will be applied to the basis, scope and the design of the 
respective liability and calculate the risk accordingly.
59 Which are excluded under the Rome II Regulation, infra no. 20.
60 Promoting this solution: P Mankowski, Art. 5, in: U. Magnus/P. Mankowski, Brussels I Regula­
tion (2007) no. 212.
61 See, H. Stoll, Rechtskollisionen bei Schuldnermehrheiten, in: Festschrift Muller-Freienfels 
(1986) 665; W.V.H. Rogers, Comparative Report on Multiple Tortfeasors, in: W.V.H. Rogers, 
Unification of Tort Law: Multiple Tortfeasors (2004) 292.
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on the v ictim ’s issues but also on those o f  the tortfeasor and seeks to balance 
both  sides. Therefore, it w ould have been advisable for the European legisla­
tor to consider the conflicting interests o f  both parties  in  the general rule so 
far as justifiable. Such a rule w ould not even have to be designed from  scratch 
since practicable solutions already exist in  some national codes and have been 
proposed by academ ics in  the last century.62 Last but not least, the arguments 
for the application o f  the lex loci delicti com m issi do not dem and exclusive 
consideration o f  this specific jurisdiction. A n exception is justified  in cases 
w here the tortfeasor is aware o f  the cross-border nature o f  his action and where 
dam age in another country is foreseeable  to him ;63 in  this case the application 
o f  the law  o f  the state where the harm  was incurred does not conflict w ith the 
legitim ate expectations o f  the tortfeasor (and in  case o f  m ultiple tortfeasors, 
their internal recourse) since he violated the conduct standards o f  that state. 
In other words, the key question in such cases should be whether, under the 
given circum stances, a reasonable person could have foreseen that his conduct 
in  one state w ould produce injury in the other state. A  general rule according 
to this basic principle w ould have rendered the num erous exceptions to the 
current rule unnecessary and w ould have balanced the legitim ate interests o f  
both  parties.
3 0  It should not be forgotten that the drafters o f  Rom e II proposed quite a similar 
idea in art. 17 o f  the Regulation providing that, regardless o f  w hich law  gov­
erns the non-contractual obligation, “account shall be taken [ ...]  o f  the rules o f  
safety a nd  conduct which were in fo rce  at the p lace  and  time o f  the event giving  
rise to the liability” (em phasis added) w hen determ ining the ac to r’s liability. 
N evertheless, this rule does not introduce a rule o f  choice o f  law  but m erely al­
lows, on a discretionary basis and in an evidentiary sense, mere consideration 
o f  this factor. Despite the use o f  the im perative “shall”, art. 17 does not require 
the court to apply the rules o f  conduct and safety o f  the place o f  conduct, but 
only to “take them  into account” . It is doubtful whether this provision actually 
solves the general problem  outlined above and one sees that only two future 
possibilities for the application o f  lex loci delicti com m issi to unforeseeable 
and, thus, non-attributable dam age rem ains: E ither the general rule o f  art. 4  is 
m aintained w ithout any relation to its purpose, thereby producing inconsistent 
(or rather unjustifiable) results, or the rule is generally left aside by  w ay o f  
analogy to art. 17. This future gadgetry should have been avoided, since the 
w ording “take into account” ought to be taken seriously, sim ply because analo-
62 See Swiss PIL Code art. 133 Abs. 2: “[...] Tritt der Erfolg nicht in dem Staat ein, in dem die 
unerlaubte Handlung begangen worden ist, so ist das Recht des Staates anzuwenden, in dem 
der Erfolg eintritt, wenn der Schädiger mit dem Eintritt des Erfolges in diesem Staat rechnen 
musste”.; G. Beitzke, Auslandswettbewerb unter Inländern, Juristische Schulung (JuS) 1966, 
140: “Wer ins Ausland hinüberwirkt, muss die Folgen dieses Handelns, also Rechtsgüterverlet­
zung im Ausland, in Betracht ziehen und auch prüfen, ob er hier nicht einen unerlaubten Ein­
griff in eine Rechtssphäre begeht, einen am Erfolgsort ungerechtfertigten Erfolg herbeiführt.”; 
acknowledging the result hile basically denying the arguments above T. Kadner-Graziano, Ra- 
belsZ 73 (209) 1 (36, Fn. 111).
63 It would manifestly be absurd to assert that every case of cross-border damage is foreseeable. If 
that were the case, the above special rules (no. 22) for instance would not be necessary at all.
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gies in  conflict o f  laws enhance the tendencies o f  national courts to apply their 
lex fo ri, resulting in  internationally counter-productive judgm ents as shown by 
the following, final chapter o f  this report.
C. Personal injury
So far only divisibility from the perspective o f  procedural issues has been dis- 31 
cussed. But, even apart from  Scenarios 1 and 2 above, a specific problem  arises 
due to the different levels o f  com pensation aw arded in different states. Here, a 
m aterial category o f  dam ages, i.e. com pensation for personal injury64 leads to 
a conflict o f  laws phenom enon com m only referred to as depegage:
Scenario 3: The Spanish m otorist E runs over the Englishm an G.B. in 
Spain. The latter is rescued at the last-m inute by  physicians. G.B. is left 
paraplegic, unable to w ork and w ill need constant m edical treatm ent for 
the rest o f  his life.
Basically, the national courts w ould have to aw ard dam ages according to the 32  
law  applied; in this example Spanish law  provides the statutory scale accord­
ing to w hich dam ages have to be aw arded under the general rule o f  art. 4 Rome 
i i  Regulation. However, due to the relatively low  costs o f  substitute pleasures 
in Spain, the am ount o f  com pensation for personal suffering w ill be inadequate 
in the U nited Kingdom, i.e. the dam ages w ill not be sufficient and the basic 
principle o f  restitutio in integrum  w ill not be observed. M oreover, the opposite 
example also produces unsatisfactory results, e.g. w hen an English m otorist 
in the U nited K ingdom  runs over a Latvian pedestrian. The Latvian w ould 
receive dam ages according to the English statutory scale for personal suffer­
ing and thereby w ould be aw arded an am ount o f  dam ages m uch higher than 
is necessary in Latvia having regard to the cost o f  substitute pleasures for the 
harm  sustained there.
in  general, two fundamentally different approaches to this dilem m a are up for 33  
debate: Either cases o f  personal loss are consistently assessed by one law, e.g. 
the (foreseeable) place o f  injury or, alternatively, the otherwise uniform legal re­
lationship is split up as a  result o f  subjecting the prerequisites o f  liability and part 
o f  its consequences to different laws, e.g. to submit the com pensation o f  personal 
injury to the law o f the victim ’s place o f  habitual residence (depegage).
Rather unsurprisingly due to the relatively high awards for personal injuries 3 4  
in quota and am ount there, it has been m ost notably the English courts w hich 
have had to address this dilem m a several tim es in recent years. o rig inally , the 
English “double actionability rule” required that the tort w as actionable under 
the laws both o f  forum, i.e. English  substantive law, and the jurisdiction where 
the tort was com m itted65 -  ultim ately leading the English judge to an assess-
64 For a more detailed analysis of the problem with further references, see T. Thiede/K. Ludwi- 
chowska, ZVglRWiss 106 (2007) 92 ff.
65 Cf. Chaplin v. Boys [1971] Appeal Cases (A.C.) 356 (H.L. 1969)
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m ent o f  dam ages according to his lex fo ri, English  substantial law. This rule
w as ultim ately abolished in 1995 by  the Private International Law  A ct 1995 
(M iscellaneous Provision) creating a general presum ption for application o f 
the law  o f  the state w here the injury w as incurred66 unless it is “substantially  
more appropriate” to apply some other law.67 This general revision o f  the law 
in this area did not, however, stop English courts from  continuing to apply their 
lex fo r i  for the m easurem ent or quantification o f  damages. A s recent as 2006 
in  H arding v Wealands68, the House o f  Lords labelled these questions as p ro­
cedural, so that the law  o f  the forum -  English law  -  rather than a foreign law, 
is applicable to questions o f  m easurem ent and quantification. And, indeed, ac­
cording to the legislative history o f  the statute, Parliam ent originally intended 
that “[ ...]  issues relating to the quantum or measure o f  damages are at presen t 
and  w ill continue [ ...]  to be governed  by the law o f  the forum ; in other words, 
by the law o f  [ ...]  the United Kingdom. [The] courts w ill continue to apply our 
own rules on quantum o f  damages even in the context o f  a tort case where the 
court decides that the ‘applicable la w ’ should  be som e foreign  system o f  law so 
fa r  as concerns the merits o f  the claim .”69
3 5  Beyond doubt, the English approach to the personal injuries dilemma, i.e. clas­
sifying quantification o f  dam ages as procedural, is absurd since the quantifica­
tion o f  dam ages is bottom -line and “w hat all the huffing and  pu ffing  at trial is 
about” .70 N evertheless, in  the course o f  the legislative process o f  the current 
Rom e II Regulation in the European Parliament, the English rapporteur p ro­
posed (and Parliam ent approved) quite a sim ilar approach: The parliam entar­
ians insisted on the insertion o f  an exception to the general rule in cases o f  per­
sonal injuries, to the effect that the court seised should apply “fo r  the purposes  
o f  determ ining the type o f  claim fo r  damages and  calculating the quantum o f  
the claim [ ...]  the individual v ic tim ’s p lace  o f  habitual residence [ , . . ] ” .71 The 
European Council as w ell as the Com m ission rejected this am endm ent and fi­
nally  a com prom ise was found in  the form o f  the insertion o f  Recital 33 o f  the 
Regulation providing that w hen “quantifying damages fo r  persona l injuries in 
cases in which the [w rongful conduct] takes p lace in a State other than that o f  
habitual residence o f  the victim, the court se ised  should  take into account all 
the relevant actual circumstances o f  the specific victim, including in particu lar  
the actual losses and  costs o f  after-care and  m edical attention .” In addition, a 
Review  Clause w as im plem ented into the Regulation, dem anding a study on 
the national differences in  com pensation levels not later than 2 0 11.72
66 Cf. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, § 11.
67 Cf. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, § 12.
68 Harding v. Wealands [2006] United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL) 32, [2006] 3 Weekly 
Law Reports (W.L.R.) 83.
69 Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 83, para. 37.
70 R.J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Quantification of Damages: A Judgment of the House of 
Lords Makes a Bad Rule Worse, 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 311 (313).
71 Eur. Parl. Final (A6-0211/2005 of 27 June 2005).
72 Art. 30 Rome II Regulation.
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The English and E uropean parliam entarians argued that their solution provides 3 6  
a viable solution for the victim  -  he w ill be com pensated according to the stan­
dards at his habitual residence. As a consequence, differences in  the am ount 
o f  dam ages awarded in personal injury cases in Europe are adjusted to a very 
large extent. M oreover, the assignm ent o f  dam ages to the v ictim ’s place o f  
habitual residence could support the general m obility o f  individuals in  Europe 
since a  victim  w ould be entitled to com pensation as i f  he w as at home. Last 
but not least, Parliam ent argued that in connection w ith the direct or alternative 
jurisdiction o f  the Brussels II Regulation, the assessm ent o f  dam ages w ould 
ultim ately be easier for the judge since the place o f  habitual residence will 
regularly coincide w ith the lex fo r i .73
The general lack o f  research conducted by the European Parliam ent is best 37  
illustrated by the last argument: As explained earlier, the Brussels II Regula­
tion grants international jurisdiction at m ore places than the lex fo r i  o f  the 
victim , i.e. the place where the conduct took place, the place where the harm  
occurred and, generally, at the habitual residence o f  the defendant.74 There 
m ay be coincidence o f  course -  but not necessarily. Naturally, a court at the 
habitual residence o f  the victim  is often m ost convenient for the latter -  but, as 
already illustrated above, the convenience o f  the victim  is not a general stan­
dard applied in conflict o f  laws. H ence, it is to be assum ed that tw o different 
ju risd ictions w ill be applicable to the case. W ith the potential divergence o f  
the law  o f  the habitual residence o f  the v ictim  from  the lex fo ri, a  further 
d isadvantage to this solution becom es obvious: The law  applicable to the 
case w ill be doubled. For exam ple, the law  at the place w here the harm  oc­
curred w ill be applied to the prerequisites o f  liability  w hereas another law, 
i.e. the law  at the habitual residence o f  the victim , w ill be applied to evaluate 
the consequences o f  the w rongful conduct. Even i f  the lex fo r i  and the law  
at the habitual residence o f  the v ictim  coincide, a  second law, i.e. the lex 
damni, w ill be applicable to the same case. Hence, the solution supplied by 
depegage is not practical at all.
This divergence is not lim ited to practical considerations but extends to a  dog- 3 8  
m atic unsustainability: A  depegage in a single case results in  a legal situation 
form erly non-existent in both o f  the laws applied to the case and, hence, differ­
ent from the legal situation in both  jurisdictions. This dogm atic inconsistency 
provokes num erous shortcomings. Thus, even the alleged enhancem ent o f  the 
m obility o f  European citizens and sound adm inistration o f  justice in particular 
cases m ust be seriously doubted since the application o f  two sets o f  liabil­
ity regim es result e.g. in two different aw ards for dam ages in the same road 
traffic accident if  the victim s have their habitual residences in  two different 
countries. Furtherm ore, it m ust be considered that the national legislators do 
not award dam ages arbitrarily but in connection w ith the prerequisites o f  the 
claim. Regularly, higher standards governing the prerequisites lead to gener-
73 Eur. Parl. Final (A6-0211/2005 of 27 June 2005).
74 Cf. infra no. 10 ff.
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ous indem nification o f  dam ages and vice versa . In cases w ith strict liability at 
the place where the harm  occurred and a liability based on fault a t the habitual 
residence o f  the victim , a detachm ent o f  basis and result o f  liability is not only 
im practical but also sim ply preposterous.
3 9  The depeçage solution to the personal injuries dilem m a draws the protective 
cloak o f  his domestic jurisdiction around the victim , ignoring the legitim ate 
expectations o f  the tortfeasor. Judges m ay find it obnoxious to have to explain 
to tortfeasors w hy the am ount o f  damages ultim ately aw arded to the victim  
does not depend on the specific situation and the particular case but rather on 
the habitual residence o f  the latter: W hy should liability depend on the ques­
tion o f  w hether the pedestrian knocked down is o f  dom estic or foreign citizen­
ship? It m ust be em phasized that the thin or “egg-shell skull” rule75 does not 
apply here since this basic principle refers m ore to the physical constitution o f  
the victim  than his place o f  residence.
4 0  Furtherm ore, countries w ith a  low er standard o f  indem nification or a barème 
system  are not likely to em brace a depeçage solution. I f  a  citizen o f  such a 
country com m its a tort in  w hich a national o f  a country w ith a  high standard o f  
indem nification is injured, e.g. a road traffic accident, the com pulsory liability 
insurance is obliged to pay -  from the insurer’s perspective -  an extraordinari­
ly  high am ount o f  damages. The paym ent is added to costs that are used to cal­
culate future prem ium s not only for the tortfeasor but for the w hole insurance 
pool, i.e. all other policy holders,76 causing such to increase. M oreover, the 
above-described criterion o f  foreseeability m ust be duly taken into account: 
I f  the tortfeasor cannot reasonably foresee the need for insuring at the higher 
level, it is unfair to im pose the law  o f  the habitual residence o f  the victim  for 
the com pensation o f  the latter.
41 Thus, the depeçage solution focuses (yet again) too m uch on the (alleged) v ic­
tim  and discounts the legitim ate interests o f  the tortfeasor. M oreover, it m ust 
be called into question whether this solution is still the application o f  law  in 
general: N o legislator can reasonably foresee w hat w ill happen i f  the prerequi­
sites o f  a claim  are disconnected from its results. Hence, a  depeçage is subject 
to chance and thus arbitrary.
4 2  Finally, the fact that the U nited Kingdom  has agreed to be bound by  Rome 
II77 and that the Council and Com m ission rejected the European Parliam ent’s 
proposal and concluded the above-m entioned agreem ent not to authorize the 
application o f  the law  o f  the v ictim ’s habitual residence but only to take it “into
75 M. Lunney/K. Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed. 2003) 274; T. Thiede/K. Ludwi- 
chowska, ZVglRWiss 106 (2007), 92 ff.
76 See, e.g. D.J. McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 Insurance Counsel Journal 
(Ins. Couns. J.) 1968, 398, 401.
77 Council Common Position (EC) No. 22/2006 of 25 Sept. 2006, art. 15, 2006 O.J. (C 289E) 68, 
70, para. 35.
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account” (emphasis added), m ust be w elcom ed.78 In the face o f  the above ar­
guments, the resulting constraint, w hich narrows the scope and im petus o f  the 
Parliam ent’s am endm ent considerably, should be taken seriously -  otherwise 
fo rum  shopping  to English courts w ould be m aintained in  the above-described 
manner.
IV. Conclusion
W hereas some national solutions m ay have been the result o f  the dem and 4 3  
for the protection o f  national citizens and m ay be understandable from  this 
perspective, the European institutions recently docum ented a gross m isunder­
standing o f  conflict o f  laws in general: The subject is not a technical sw itch­
stand for the overcom ing o f  fundam ental differences in  national legal systems.
It is im possible to circum vent differences resulting from  a foreign elem ent by 
m eans o f  policy considerations w hich only focus on the victim  and the best 
indem nification for said victim. Conflict o f  laws is not an annex to the exist­
ing national liability rules but a  coherent and delicate system in itself, w hich 
has to be understood in  term s o f  its principles before significant changes are 
introduced. Hence, any change m ust be tested against all law-fact patterns in 
this area o f  law. Such a test is provided by  all cases o f  divisibility and aggrega­
tion o f  dam age and should hence be regarded in  future European enterprises 
in this area.
78 See M. McParland, Tort injuries aboard and the Rome II Regulation: a brief wakeup-call for 
existing claims, [2008] Journal of Personal Injury Law (J.P.I.L.) 221; A. Rushworth/A. Scott, 
Rome II: Choice of law for non-contractual obligations, [2008] Lloyd’s Maritime and Com­
mercial Law Quarterly (LMCLQ) 274, 294.
